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Articles
International

Prof. Michael J. Graetz*

A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax
Treatment of Interest Expenses
The question of the proper treatment of interest
expenses has generally been looked at from the
perspective of either inbound or outbound
investment and with the view that nations are
either debtors or creditors, not both. As a result,
the issues of residence countries’ limitations on
interest deductions on borrowing to finance taxfavoured foreign-source income, on the one
hand, and of source countries’ restrictions on
interest deductions intended to limit companies’
ability to strip income from a higher-tax to a
lower-tax country, on the other, have generally
been treated as separate issues, with no real
effort to show how they relate. This article
demonstrates their linkage and proposes a
multilateral solution that would address both of
these problems.
1. Introduction
Although there has been some discussion in recent years
of the treatment of borrowing and its attendant interest
expenses, the tax treatment of this expense has generally
received less analysis than that of business income. Some
recent developments, however – including greater taxpayer sophistication in structuring and locating international financing arrangements, increased government
concerns with the role of debt in sophisticated tax avoidance techniques, and disruption by decisions of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) of a host of Member
States’ regimes for limiting interest deductions – have
stimulated new laws and policy controversies concerning the international tax treatment of interest expenses.
Recent developments make clear the complexity, the
incoherence and the futility of countries acting independently to limit interest deductions.1 They also raise
fundamental questions about the proper treatment of
interest expenses and whether other expenses, such as
for headquarters costs or research and development
(R&D), should raise similar concerns.
National rules are in flux regarding the financing of both
inbound and outbound transactions. When outbound
investments are financed by debt, the question arises
whether the fact that the foreign-source income will be
deferred or taxed at lower rates justifies the home country limiting the deductibility of interest expenses. In the
United States and the United Kingdom, for example,
attention has recently focused on whether to allocate and
disallow interest deductions connected to foreign-source
income under a dividend exemption system.2 Also in the
U.S., House Ways and Means Committee Chairman
Charles Rangel (Democrat, New York) has introduced
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legislation under the U.S. foreign tax credit system that
would allocate and postpone interest deductions on outbound investments until dividends are repatriated.3
The EU Member States have recently been revising their
treatment of interest deductions with special concern
for the taxation of inbound investments. As in the outbound context, the critical questions stem from government concerns about the potential for a disappearing
corporate tax base. In Europe, the greatest attention has
focused on the treatment of “fat” or “thin” capitalization
rules (known in the U.S. as “earnings stripping rules”).
Reconsideration of Member States’ limitations on interest deductions in this context was required by the ECJ in
its 2002 decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case (and
subsequent decisions), which struck down Germany’s
thin capitalization rules as applied to interest paid to
companies from other Member States as a violation of
the freedom of establishment guarantee of the EC
Treaty.4 These ECJ decisions require equal treatment of
* © Michael J. Graetz, 2008. Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor, Yale Law
School, New Haven, Connecticut.
1. For a useful summary of recent developments, see the excellent General
Report authored by Pascal Hinny and the 34 Branch Reports on Subject 2:
New tendencies in tax treatment of cross-border interest of corporations, in
Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 93b (2008) (62nd Congress of the
International Fiscal Association, Brussels, 2008). See also Arnold, Brian, General Report on Subject I: Deductibility of interest and other financing charges
in computing income, in Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 79a (1994),
at 491 (48th Congress of the International Fiscal Association, Toronto, 1994);
and Shaviro, Daniel N., “Does More Sophisticated Mean Better? A Critique of
Alternative Approaches to Sourcing the Interest Expense of American Multinationals”, 54 Tax Law Review 353 (2001).
2. The proposals by the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation and the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform for a dividend exemption system
would require the allocation and disallowance of interest expenses incurred
to earn foreign-source income. See U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation, Options
to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, JCS-02-05 (27 January 2005); and President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair,
and Pro-Growth: Proposal to Fix America’s Tax System (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 2005). In contrast, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury recently issued a report on the competitiveness of U.S. businesses
that suggests a dividend exemption system with no allocation of interest. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the
U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st Century (20 December 2007). See also
HM Treasury and HM Revenue & Customs, Taxation of the Foreign Profits of
Companies: A Discussion Document (June 2007).
3. Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Congress,
§§ 975-977 (2007). This is one of several proposals designed to help finance a
lower corporate income tax rate in the United States. In addition, Congress
passed legislation in 2004, effective in 2009, that would shift from water’s edge
interest allocation to worldwide allocation for purposes of determining the
foreign tax credit limitation, but that change has now been postponed until
2011. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law 110-289, 122
Stat. 3039. See discussion at notes 19-21, infra.
4. Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, Case C-324/00, 2002
ECR I-11,779. In Lankhorst-Hohorst, the ECJ considered a law under which
German subsidiaries of non-German parent companies were denied deductions for interest paid to the foreign parent company when the subsidiary
had a high debt-to-equity ratio, although such deductions were allowed for
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borrowing by domestic and non-domestic companies
that are from the EU Member States. In response, Germany now limits interest deductibility to a specified percentage (30%) of “earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization” (EBITDA) without regard to
whether the borrowing is from a foreign lender or a
related company. Similar rules are being enacted or considered by certain other EU Member States.
In November 2007, the U.S. Treasury issued a report on
earnings stripping in response to a congressional mandate requiring such a study as part of legislation dealing
with corporate inversions from U.S.-headquartered to
foreign-headquartered companies.5 In Canada, questions about limitations on interest deductions have
arisen in the context of a broad review of international
tax policy.6 And in Belgium, for example, a notional
interest deduction based on a company’s net assets was
enacted in 2006 in an effort to reduce the advantages for
debt over equity financing.7 In addition to the foregoing
specific rules, interest deductions may also be disallowed under general anti-abuse rules or transfer pricing
regimes.
Some countries levy withholding taxes on cross-border
payments of interest, although most do not. Where
applicable, the withholding tax rates vary from about
12.5% (Italy) to nearly 42% (Mexico), but are often
reduced or eliminated by bilateral tax treaties. (The
OECD Model Tax Convention sets a maximum rate of
10%.) These treaty reductions are, in turn, restricted to
residents of the treaty country by limitation on benefits
clauses in the treaties. Obviously, a sufficiently high
withholding tax on payments of interest can substitute
for disallowing interest deductions.
As this very brief overview implies, the treatment of
cross-border interest payments is now one of the most
complex aspects of income tax law. Rules differ among
countries and contexts. As a result of the decisions of the
ECJ, some uncertainty remains in Europe about what
rules are permissible. The subject is further complicated
by different countries’ varying approaches to distinguishing interest payments from dividends. Moreover,
because money is fungible, it is difficult in both theory
and practice to know the “purpose” of specific borrowing. Nevertheless, many countries attempt to “trace” borrowed funds to their use, creating opportunities for creative tax planning and inducing inevitable disputes
between taxpayers and tax collectors.
These disparities in law and practice create opportunities for either double or zero taxation. Since taxpayers
generally have great control over the location of their
borrowing, there is considerably greater risk of the latter.
Heretofore, in both the literature and policymaking, the
question of the proper treatment of interest expenses
has generally been looked at from the perspective of
either inbound or outbound investment and with the
view that nations are either debtors or creditors, not
both. As a result, the issues of residence countries’ limitations on interest deductions on borrowing to finance
© IBFD

low-taxed, exempt or deferred foreign-source income,
on the one hand, and of source countries’ restrictions on
interest deductions intended to limit companies’ ability
to strip income from a higher-tax to a lower-tax country,
on the other, have generally been treated as separate
issues. Each of these issues has been discussed in the literature, but there has been no real effort to show how
they relate. A fundamental contribution of this article is
to demonstrate their linkage and to call for a multilateral
solution that would address both of these problems.
I shall use the following simple and stylized example to
illustrate the fundamental issues and to show how they
are connected. At the outset, the example assumes that
the purpose of the taxpayer’s borrowing is known; I shall
deal subsequently with this oversimplification.
2. A Simple Example to Illustrate the Issues
Assume three countries: H – with a corporate income
tax rate of 35%, M – with a 25% rate, and L – with a 15%
rate. H is a high corporate tax rate country, such as the
U.S. or Japan; M, like most of western Europe, has a corporate tax rate a bit below the OECD average; and L, like
China and Ireland for example, has a low corporate tax
rate. For simplicity of exposition, H is assumed to want
to tax only the domestic-source income of both its residents and non-residents, and it therefore exempts foreign-source dividends.8 The policy choice for H is (1)
allowing interest deductions in full whenever borrowing
occurs in H without regard to where the investment it
finances occurs, or (2) disallowing interest deductions
when borrowing is determined to be used for investing
abroad. Thus, to the policymakers of H, the question is
whether to disallow interest deductions when interest is
incurred to finance exempt (or low-taxed) income. For
reasons that will be made clear subsequently, an interest
disallowance regime should disallow interest deductions
only when the company’s borrowing is disproportionately greater in H than elsewhere based on an allocation
of interest expenses that compares the ratio of the company’s H borrowing to H assets with the ratio of its
worldwide borrowing to worldwide assets.
payments by German subsidiaries to German parent companies. See also
Bosal Holding, Case C-168/01 (13 October 2003); and Test Claimants in the
Thin Cap Group Litigation, Case C-524/04 (13 March 2007).
5. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on Earnings
Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties (November 2007).
6. The 19 March 2007 Canadian federal budget included a proposal to
eliminate the deductibility of interest on debt incurred by Canadian corporations to finance foreign affiliates. In the face of significant criticism,
on 14 May 2007 Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty announced significant
changes to the interest deductibility proposals. The 14 May 2007 news release
is available on the Department of Finance web site at www.fin.gc.ca/
news07/07-041e.html. The 2007 Canadian federal budget is available at
www.budget.gc.ca/2007/index_e.html.
7. See Martin, Stéphane and Patrick Smet, Branch Report for Belgium
on Subject 2: New tendencies in tax treatment of cross-border interest of
corporations, in Cahiers de droit fiscal international, Vol. 93b, supra note 1,
at 127, 139.
8. I use an exemption system for illustrative purposes here both for clarity
in the exposition of the issues and because it is the dominant method of
relieving double taxation of income on outbound investment within the
OECD. Only the Czech Republic, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand,
Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States use foreign tax credits. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, supra note 2, at 19, Table 1.5.
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Take a simple case where an H resident company borrows 100 in H to finance an investment of 100 in L.
Assume that the interest expense is 10 and the income
from the L investment is 15. If the interest expense were
deducted against the L income, the net income from the
L investment would be 5, which at the 15% L rate would
yield an L income tax of 0.75 and after-tax income of
4.25 to the H company. There would be no domestic
income or deduction in H and no H tax.
If borrowing could be traced to its use, this seems a plausible answer. But, because money is fungible, such tracing is not feasible in practice (despite the commonplace
efforts to do so). So it seems reasonable to conclude that
the company borrowed in order to keep all of its worldwide assets (rather than selling one or more assets to
make the investment in L) and to avoid issuing new
equity. This explains why H should treat borrowing as
occurring proportionately to the H company’s worldwide assets.9
If, however, H has no interest disallowance rule and
allows the 10 of interest to be deducted in full against
other income that would otherwise be taxed by H at its
35% rate, this would save the company 3.50 in H income
taxes. The 15 of income in L would result in an L income
tax of 2.25. The H company would have earned 6.25 after
tax on an investment yielding just 5 before tax – implying not just zero taxation of the L income, but in fact a
negative rate of taxation, a subsidy for this investment.
From the point of view of H, this investment would have
cost it 3.50 in foregone revenue, 1.25 of which would go
to the H company and 2.25 of which would go to the
treasury of L.10 Perhaps some argument (presumably on
competitiveness grounds) can be made for H subsidizing this investment by the H company, but what argument is there in a case such as this for transferring revenues from H’s treasury to the treasury of L simply
because the company chose to locate its borrowing for
this investment in H? If H is revenue constrained, the
3.50 of revenue lost on this investment must be made up
from somewhere else, and important economic and distributional consequences will turn on who and what is
taxed.
Moreover, at its 15% tax rate, the government of L should
get only 0.75 in income taxes on an investment yielding
a pre-tax profit of 5, rather than the 2.25 it did receive –
an amount equivalent to levying a 45% tax on the company’s before-tax profits. Under current arrangements,
however, L will allow no deduction for interest expenses
when the borrowing takes place in H, so the government
of L might get 2.25 in taxes whether H allows the interest
deduction or not. But the consequences will be very different depending on whether that money comes from
the H company or from other H taxpayers. If H disallows
the entire interest deduction in this case and L does not
allow any deduction because the borrowing occurred in
H, H will collect its 35% tax on the company’s domestic
income and, as indicated above, L’s income tax of 2.25
would produce a tax rate of 45% on this investment – a
rate higher than that in either of these countries. In other
488
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words, there would be a significant element of double
taxation.
The H company, of course, could avoid this double tax
by, for example, locating the borrowing in L rather than
H. And if each country is to tax the net domestic income
earned there, the interest deduction should be allowed
by L, not H.
Internation equity also supports this result. In this
example, the source country is given not only the first
bite at taxing the active business income earned there,
but the sole claim on taxing such income. Given the priority of source countries on the asset side, why should
the residence country also be required to lose revenue
on the liability side? The source country, by not allowing
deduction of the interest, is the cause of the double tax.
Why should it be the residence country’s responsibility
to undo that result – especially when the residence
country is not even making a residual claim to tax the
foreign income?
For an important variation on this basic example,
assume now that M, with its income tax rate of 25%, has
no interest disallowance rule. If the H company also has
income and assets located in M, it might choose to borrow in M instead of H or L and deduct the 10 of interest
against income that M would otherwise tax. In that case,
the H company would save 2.50 of tax in M and pay
income tax to L of 2.25 for an after-tax return of 5.25 on
an investment yielding 5 before tax – again earning a
return that is higher after tax than before tax. In this case,
however, the 0.25 subsidy to the H company and the 2.25
transfer to the treasury of L would come from the taxpayers of M rather than H.
The policymakers of the M government would view this
transaction as a problem of earnings stripping (or thin
capitalization) by the H company. Thus, economically
similar transactions will fit into different traditional
analytic boxes depending on which country is examining the transaction and where the borrowing takes place.
Here again, if the borrowing company were resident in
M, it is perhaps conceivable that some argument or
empirical claim could be advanced for this treatment (as
before, no doubt grounded in the competitive advantages to M’s residents of a resident company making this
investment11), but it seems impossible to fashion an

9. I ignore here the theoretical difficulty and practical necessity of using
the book value rather than the fair market value of assets. Relying on basis,
rather than value, does have the advantage of resolving the difficult issue of
intangible assets since the costs of self-created intangibles are typically
deducted rather than capitalized.
10. In theory, the revenue lost to H through the interest deduction might be
made up if H were to tax the lender on the interest income. While the precise
dimensions of this possibility are difficult to get a handle on, as a practical
matter, given the large holdings of U.S. corporate debt in tax-exempt retirement accounts, university endowments and other tax-exempt entities and by
foreigners, this is quite unlikely – at least in the U.S.
11. See Samuels, John, Vice President & Senior Counsel of Tax Policy and
Planning, General Electric, “True North: Charting a Course for U.S. International Tax Policy in the Global Economy”, the David R. Tillinghast Lecture on
International Taxation, 25 September 2007 (forthcoming in Tax Law Review);
see also the discussion at notes 35-37, infra.
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argument that this transfer from the treasury of M to
both the H company and L’s treasury makes any sense at
all as a deliberate policy choice of M. Of course, if M is
an EU Member State, the decisions of the ECJ in
Lankhorst-Hohorst and subsequent cases might not
allow it to treat an H company any differently than an M
company.12 And it is also possible that the non-discrimination clause of M’s bilateral tax treaties might foreclose
it from making such a distinction.13
To complete the analysis, it is worth noting that an M
company contemplating a debt-financed investment in
L would have an incentive to do its borrowing in H (if it
had assets and income there) so that its interest deduction would offset income that would otherwise be taxed
at H’s higher 35% rate. Thus, H will also have earnings
stripping (or thin capitalization) problems to deal with.
3. How Interest Expenses Should Be Allocated
3.1. A word about source
It is fundamental that, except in the context of a system
of current taxation of worldwide income with an unlimited foreign tax credit – a system that no country now
has, ever has had, or is likely ever to have – it is essential
for each nation to distinguish between domestic-source
income and foreign-source income. The consequences
of this distinction vary depending on a country’s tax rate
and its system for avoiding double taxation. In the U.S.
foreign tax credit system, for example, the distinction
between foreign-source and domestic-source income is
important principally for determining the limitation on
foreign tax credits; in an exemption system, it is important for measuring taxable versus exempt income.
But, as is well known, the “source” of income is not well
grounded economically, nor is it conceptually straightforward.14 In many instances (not discussed here),
archaic rules and distinctions prevail.15 Moreover, the
current rules often stem from political decisions and
compromises made scores of years ago when capital was
far less mobile. The sourcing of interest, for example, was
a contentious decision made in the 1920s during the initial formulation of international agreements for relieving double taxation.16 Since both net foreign-source and
domestic-source income must be measured, however, it
is necessary to source both income and deductions, even
if the current sourcing rules seem arbitrary and archaic.
3.2. The effect of different rules in different countries
As the foregoing example illustrates and the empirical
economics literature amply demonstrates, different tax
rates in different countries create incentives for companies both in choosing where to locate real investments
and in shifting income and deductions around the
world.17 And, as the example above illustrates, when
countries differ in their rules for determining the source
of a particular kind of income, both double taxation and
zero (or even negative) taxation can occur. U.S. multinationals frequently complain, for example, about the double taxation that occurs because the U.S. allocates and
© IBFD

disallows interest (for foreign tax credit limitation purposes) while other countries do not allow deduction of
the interest disallowed by the U.S. They stifle such complaints, however, when in other contexts the lack of harmonization allows them to avoid taxation in any country.18 In the absence of multilateral agreement, these
difficulties, opportunities and issues will persist.
As a result, it is treacherous to evaluate companies’
claims of competitive disadvantage based on pairwise
distinctions of specific rules. To know whether a company headquartered in one country is advantaged or disadvantaged compared to another company headquartered elsewhere, one would have to compare the totality
of consequences of similar investments. In the literature,
this typically occurs only through efforts to measure the
overall effective tax rates. These exercises typically simply assume a certain proportion of debt and equity
finance, and therefore do not address the issues I am
addressing here, in particular, the location of borrowing.
In any event, piecemeal policy-by-policy comparisons
should be taken with a grain of salt; a disadvantage in
one aspect of tax policy may be compensated for by an
advantage elsewhere. Taxpayers obviously have incentives to highlight their disadvantages rather than their
advantages.
3.3. The particular difficulty of tracing interest
deductions to the income the borrowing finances
Given the fungibility of money, knowing the purpose of
borrowing is an impossible quest. Nevertheless, even for
purely domestic investments, the U.S. tax law, for example, distinguishes among categories of personal interest,
investment interest and a wide variety of business interest costs. The U.S. has essentially been undaunted by the
folly of attempting to trace borrowed money to its use.
So have many other countries. This is one reason why
the tax provisions governing interest deductions, which
frequently condition the deductibility of interest on the

12. Lankhorst-Hohorst, supra note 4, and the cases cited there.
13. Such claims were made – but ignored by the United States – in connection with the enactment of the U.S. earnings stripping rules. Graetz, Michael J.
and Alvin C. Warren, Jr., “Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
Economic Integration of Europe”, 115 Yale Law Journal 1186 (2006); Warren,
Jr., Alvin C., “Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce”,
54 Tax Law Review 131 (2001).
14. Ault, Hugh J. and David Bradford, “Taxing International Income: An
Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises”, in Razin, Assaf and
Joel Slemrod (eds.), Taxation in the Global Economy (1990), at 11.
15. See e.g. Colón, Jeffery M., “Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the Crossroads”, 1999 University of Illinois
Law Review 775.
16. See Graetz, Michael J. and Michael O’Hear, “The ‘Original Intent’ of
International Taxation”, 46 Duke Law Journal 1021 (1997).
17. Gordon, Roger H. and James R. Hines, International Taxation, National
Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper No. 8854-4 (2002); European
Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Company Taxation in the
International Market, COM(2001) 582 (2001).
18. Kane, Mitchell, “Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to
International Tax Arbitrage”, 53 Emory Law Journal 89 (2004); Ring, Diane,
“One Nation Among Many: Policy Implications of Cross-Border Tax
Arbitrage, 44 Boston College Law Review 79 (2002); Rosenbloom, H. David,
“International Tax Arbitrage and the ‘International Tax System’”, 53 Tax Law
Review 137 (2000).
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purpose of the indebtedness, are now among the most
complex in the income tax. These complexities, and the
controversies about them, often occur, as in the instant
context, because of the tax-favoured treatment of assets
financed with borrowed funds.
In the context of cross-border investments, beginning
with the regulations issued in 1977, the U.S. generally
accepted the fact that money is fungible and apportioned the interest expense of U.S. corporate entities for
foreign tax credit purposes according either to the
(book) value of assets or to gross income.19 The assets
approach was most widely used; thus, interest deductions (for foreign tax credit limitation purposes only)
were generally computed using the following (simplified) formula: allowable U.S. interest expense equals
worldwide interest expense times the ratio of U.S. assets
to worldwide assets. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 refined
this concept by looking at interest expenses on a consolidated basis for affiliated corporations rather than on an
entity-by-entity basis. The 1986 law, however, unfortunately and erroneously ignored foreign subsidiaries in
this calculation,20 which is why it became known as
“water’s edge allocation”. But that defect was remedied by
legislation in 2004, which will treat all members of a
worldwide group as a single corporation.21 (The 2004
corrective legislation, however, was not scheduled to
take effect until 2009 and, in 2008, the legislation was
delayed until 2011.22)
A worldwide allocation system, based on the ratio of
debt to assets, is the most appropriate method for measuring domestic-source and foreign-source income if
interest expense is to be allocated.23 Importantly, worldwide allocation based on assets implies that interest deductions will not be treated as allocable to foreign-source
income and disallowed except when borrowing in one
country is disproportionate to borrowing elsewhere.
4. What is at Stake in the Treatment of Interest
Expenses?
4.1. Location of investment
Some argue that the failure to allocate interest deductions on a worldwide basis will create an inappropriate
incentive for companies to invest abroad rather than at
home. The example above demonstrates why this might
be true. It is important to recognize, however, that the
fundamental income tax incentive for a company to
invest in a low-tax country, such as L, rather than in
higher-tax countries, such as H (or M), is due to the
lower tax rate in L. Extensive econometric evidence
shows that, although business, not tax, considerations
often dominate, the location of investments is significantly influenced by tax rate differences, and an important study by the European Commission has concluded
that differences in tax rates are the principal income tax
factor affecting decisions about the location of investments.24 The essential point is this: the incentive to
invest in L rather than in H exists even if the investments
are financed solely by equity and no interest deductions
are at issue. An investment in H yielding 5 before tax will
490

BULLETIN FOR INTERNATIONAL TAXATION NOVEMBER 2008

produce only 3.25 after tax, compared to the 4.25 available after tax for an investment in L. Only by eliminating
the tax rate differential – through harmonization of tax
rates or a capital-export neutrality policy of current taxation by H of the income earned in L with a foreign tax
credit for M’s taxes, a policy no country has adopted –
will that incentive be eliminated.
Careful analyses of situations where assets eligible for
favourable tax treatment are acquired with debt, such as
where borrowing occurs to finance domestic tax-exempt
income or other tax-favoured domestic investments, for
example in plant and equipment, have also concluded
that it is the tax preference, not the borrowing, that is the
fundamental stimulant to the investment.25 In such
instances, it may even be the case that disallowing interest deductions will inhibit the effectiveness of the underlying tax preference.26 But these analyses focus on cases
where both the income taxation on the asset side and the
tax treatment of the interest expense are controlled by
the same domestic policymaking process. Importantly,
with the issue here, the tax preference on the asset side –
the low tax rate in L – is outside the control of the H or
M government. And, as the example demonstrates,
allowing full deduction of the interest on the borrowing
in H (or M) will tend to exacerbate the preference for
investments in low-tax countries by producing an overall negative rate of income tax on the foreign investment.

19. For a history of interest allocation, see Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Airel
Assa, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income (2007), at 236-240. For an analysis suggesting that worldwide allocation of interest is “more consistent [than water’s
edge allocation] with the basic objective of the foreign tax credit limit” and
details about the formulas that have been used in the United States, see
Gravelle, Jane G. and Donald J. Marples, “The Foreign Tax Credit’s Allocation
Rules”, Congressional Research Service (16 May 2008).
20. To my knowledge, no respectable policy argument has been made in
support of the U.S. system of water’s edge allocation. It is an unprincipled
revenue grab enacted in 1986 that has remained in the law far too long, but the
U.S. Congress, seeking revenues to finance other tax reductions, seems determined to keep it in place at least for a while longer.
21. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Public Law 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418,
§ 401.
22. See note 3, supra.
23. The comparison, for example, is U.S. debt to U.S. assets versus worldwide
debt to worldwide assets, with allocation to a foreign source required only
when the former ratio is greater than the latter (or, alternatively, the ratio of
U.S. borrowing to worldwide borrowing must be the same or less than the
ratio of U.S. assets to worldwide assets). There may, however, be an argument
for looking at interest on a net basis, i.e. looking only at the excess of interest
expense over interest income, but I will put that issue aside here. It is probably
most important for financial institutions.
24. European Commission, supra note 17. See Hines, Jr., James R., Tax Policy
and the Activities of Multinational Corporations, National Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper No. W5589 (1996).
25. See e.g. Warren, Jr., Alvin C. and Alan J. Auerbach, “Transferability of Tax
Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing”, 95 Harvard Law
Review 1752 (1982); see also Pearlman, Ronald A., “A Tax Reform Caveat: In
the Real World, There is no Perfect Tax System”, in Auerbach, Alan J. and Kevin
A. Hassett (eds.), Toward Fundamental Tax Reform (2005).
26. There is controversy, for example, in the U.S. policy literature over the
merits of § 265(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which disallows interest
deductions on indebtedness used to purchase or carry state and local bonds
the interest on which is exempt from income tax. 26 U.S.C. § 265(a)(2); see
Chirelstein, Marvin A., Federal Income Taxation: A Law Student’s Guide to the
Leading Cases and Concepts (10th ed., 2005), § 6.06(a).
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4.2. Creating incentives for bad investments
As the example above illustrates, allowing a deduction in
a higher-tax country for borrowing to invest in lowertax countries can produce after-tax returns greater than
the investment’s pre-tax returns. This means that investments that would not be undertaken by anyone in a
world without any corporate income taxes may become
attractive in a world with varying tax rates and no interest allocation. Such investments will clearly decrease
worldwide welfare and will, almost certainly, decrease
welfare in the countries where the interest deductions
are allowed.27 Empirical evidence about the benefits that
might justify such a policy does not exist, nor does it
seem likely that any evidence will be forthcoming that
would justify such negative taxes as standard policy. A
far better policy, as discussed below, would be for all
countries to allow interest deductions on borrowing in
proportion to the assets in that country regardless of
where the borrowing takes place.
4.3. Choice of debt over equity finance
Allowing an interest deduction without allocation
increases the advantage of debt over equity as a source of
corporate finance. However, as with the decision about
where to invest, the crux of this problem lies not with the
failure to allocate interest, but more fundamentally with
the general corporate income tax disparity between the
treatment of debt and equity. Much has been written on
behalf of a variety of corporate tax integration proposals
to eliminate or reduce this disparity.28 But no country
has achieved parity between debt and equity finance by
disallowing deductions for interest, nor does that seem
likely to occur. Interest deductions will continue to be
generally allowed, but whenever debt finance is permitted to produce interest deductions that will offset
income otherwise taxed at a higher rate than that on the
income resulting from the borrowing, this will exacerbate the advantage of debt finance. Such a regime also
affects companies’ decisions about the location of debt
and equity finance so as to maximize the tax savings
from the disparities in their treatment.
4.4. Location of borrowing
Allowing an interest deduction in H, even if the borrowing is disproportionately located in H, will encourage
companies to locate their borrowing in H whenever the
tax rate in H is higher than elsewhere. For example, both
companies headquartered in the U.S. and companies
headquartered elsewhere will prefer to deduct their
interest expense against U.S. income (if they have any)
that would be taxed at 35%, rather than to use the interest deduction in a country where it would offset income
that would be taxed at a lower rate.29 Indeed, given the
mobile nature of corporations’ ability to borrow, borrowing may disproportionately be located in H almost as
easily for a foreign multinational as for a domestic-headquartered company.30 There seems to be no good policy
reason for the U.S. to want to encourage borrowing that
finances foreign investments to be located in the U.S.
© IBFD

Interest is not the only expense that companies incur
which produces foreign-source income taxed at a low
rate. For example, expenditures for R&D may, over time,
yield royalty income both domestically and abroad.
Under the U.S. foreign tax credit system, the foreignsource royalties may bear little or no corporate income
tax anywhere.31 Likewise, headquarters expenses, often
described as general and administrative or stewardship
costs, tend to be concentrated in the country where a
company locates its headquarters, even though these
expenses support the company’s production of income
throughout the world. In both of these cases, some commentators have argued for a full deduction of these costs
in the country where they occur without regard to where
the income is earned or whether it is taxed anywhere.32
These arguments, however, are grounded in the special
benefits of these expenditures to the country where they
occur – due, for example, to positive externalities from
R&D and the high-quality jobs at stake in both R&D and
headquarters activities. No similar arguments are available for the location of borrowing transactions.
4.5. Internation equity between source and residence
countries
Under current international income tax arrangements,
the source country is generally given not only the first
bite at taxing the active business income earned there,
but in many cases, through the domestic exemption of
foreign-source dividends, the sole claim on taxing such
income.33 This source-country priority has been established either unilaterally, such as by the United States
when it first enacted a foreign tax credit, or bilaterally
through income tax treaties. Today, this priority is a fundamental element of more than 2,000 bilateral income
tax treaties.34 But these treaties do not require countries
to allow interest deductions wherever the borrowing
occurs.35 Since source countries have the first claim to
27. The argument for repealing § 265 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code is
not applicable here; there is a great difference between transferring U.S. federal revenues to U.S. state and local governments to help them save interest
costs and transferring such revenues to low-tax foreign countries. Moreover,
although the advantages of repealing § 265 have long been known, this denial
of interest deductions remains untouched.
28. See e.g. Graetz, Michael J. and Alvin C. Warren, Jr. (eds.), Integration of the
U.S. Corporate and Individual Income Taxes: The Treasury Department and
American Law Institute Reports (1998).
29. While corporations may have considerable control over where they
locate their borrowing, that control may not be absolute: L, for example, may
not have well-developed capital markets for corporate borrowing. And there
may be economies of scale from concentrating borrowing in one or a few
places. Moreover, a corporation will have to have assets in L to deduct interest
there given L’s likely earnings stripping rules. But the government of H should
prefer L as the place for corporate borrowing to finance investments in L.
30. The foreign company would need to have adequate assets or income in
H in order not to run afoul of H’s earnings stripping rules.
31. This is because royalties are permitted to be deducted abroad, may bear
little or no withholding tax, and can be sheltered from U.S. tax through crosscrediting.
32. See e.g. Hufbauer and Assa, supra note 19, at 133-143.
33. Graetz and O’Hear, supra note 16; Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., “The Structure
of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification”, 74 Texas Law
Review 1301 (1996).
34. OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, 15 July 2005,
Arts. 23 A and 23 B.
35. They do, however, require countries not to discriminate against
foreigners.
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the tax revenues from income on business assets, it
seems incongruous that the residence country should
also be required to forego additional revenue due to the
location of liabilities there. This is not required by tax
treaties. Source countries contribute to causing the double tax by not allowing the deduction of interest
expenses. Why should residence countries be responsible for eliminating that double tax by allowing interest
deductions for borrowing used to finance assets abroad
– especially when most residence countries do not even
make a residual claim to tax the foreign-source income?

costs. (Indeed, if the U.S. is worried about the international competitiveness of its workers and businesses, a
far stronger argument exists for lowering the U.S. corporate tax rates, but that issue is well beyond the scope of
this endeavour.) To be revenue neutral, allowing interest
deductions without any limit or allocation requires
higher tax rates than would a U.S. policy which requires
worldwide allocation of interest expenses. And, for the
reasons discussed above, it is difficult to see why allowing interest deductions without allocation should be a
policy priority.

4.6. The potential for competitive disadvantage

5. A Multilateral Solution

The recent debate in the United States over the treatment of interest expenses has focused on outbound
investments and the proper scope for the allocation (and
disallowance) of interest expenses. In a turn away from
its previous view, the U.S. Treasury Department, in its
December 2007 report, Approaches to Improve the Competitiveness of the U.S. Business Tax System for the 21st
Century, called for the U.S. to allow interest deductions
in full without regard to the location of the investments
attributable to the borrowing.36 The University of Michigan economist James Hines in a recent article37 and General Electric’s top tax officer John Samuels in his New
York University Law School Tillinghast Lecture38 have
also recently advocated this policy. The Treasury report
emphasizes the complexity of interest allocation. Prof.
Hines focuses on its potential to result in advantages for
foreign over domestic ownership of businesses. And Mr
Samuels claims that the U.S. disallowance of interest
expense will put U.S.-based multinationals at a competitive disadvantage compared to companies headquartered in nations that allow interest deductions without
any such limitations.

5.1. Worldwide allocation

I cannot address these views in any detail in this article.
Nor is such discussion necessary here since my main
purpose here is to point the way to a multilateral solution
to this issue. But the breadth of the claims that the benefits to the U.S. from having U.S. multinationals make foreign investments justify full U.S. deduction of interest
under all circumstances is troubling. There is an extraordinary “race to the bottom” quality to these arguments. In
essence, they claim that the U.S. makes a mistake by disadvantaging U.S.-based companies in any aspect of the
tax law where the consensus treatment among the U.S.’s
trading partners reaches a more advantageous result.
Such claims are particularly hard to credit in a context
where U.S. multinationals have ready access to worldwide capital markets. They are likely to respond to a U.S.
rule disallowing interest deductions when borrowing is
disproportionately located in the U.S. simply by relocating their borrowing to a more favourable jurisdiction.
Moreover, such claims do not respond to any of the concerns expressed above. Nor have they been supported by
any compelling empirical evidence that either worldwide economic efficiency would be improved by such a
policy or, more narrowly, that the benefits to U.S. workers and investors from such a policy would exceed their
492
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The problems I have described here – the mismeasurement of income, potential distortions in the location of
investment, an increased incentive for debt over equity
finance, distortions in the location of borrowing, and
unjustified revenue transfers among countries – would
all disappear if all countries allocated interest deductions to assets on a uniform worldwide basis and allowed
a proportionate amount of interest expense to be
deducted against income earned domestically without
regard to where the borrowing occurs.39 Such a system
would deny interest deductions only when borrowing in
one country is disproportionately higher than in the rest
of the world.
For outbound investment, the advantages of such a
regime should by now be apparent. Incentives to locate
borrowing in high-tax countries would disappear, as
would incentives to make debt-financed investments
because their after-tax returns exceed their pre-tax
returns. Debt would be located wherever it is most economical. The revenue transfer from countries where
borrowing is located to those where investments are
made would stop. And the advantages of debt over
equity finance would be reduced somewhat.
In the case of inbound investment, where the problem is
typically described as earnings stripping or thin capitalization, there is also much to commend worldwide allocation as a mechanism for determining allowable interest. No country would have to fear that it was bearing a
disproportionate portion of a company’s interest
expense. Indeed, some EU Member States now allow
worldwide allocation as a safe-harbour method to protect companies against interest expense disallowance.
The practical difficulty with such an allocation rule for
inbound investments is that, without international

36. U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note 2, at 60.
37. Hines, James R., “Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income”, paper
delivered at New York University Law School on 14 November 2007 (forthcoming in Tax Law Review), available at taxprof.typepad.com/
taxprof_blog/files/hines_reconsidering_nov_07.pdf.
38. Samuels, supra note 11.
39. Another possibility would be to allocate interest expense proportionately to income rather than assets. This would also be a major improvement
over current laws and practices, but an allocation based on assets seems conceptually more sound and is probably easier to implement.
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cooperation, the information about a company’s total
amount of borrowing and assets necessary to calculate a
worldwide allocation may not be readily available to the
source country. This explains why source countries have
separately devised thin capitalization rules, often relying
on fixed allowable debt-to-equity ratios or fixed limits
on interest expense deductions as a percentage of
income (EBITDA) to limit interest deductions. However,
as with interest allocation for outbound investments,
disallowing interest deductions through earnings stripping or thin capitalization rules – when, as is generally
the case, the interest disallowed by the source country
will not be allowed by the residence country – may lead
to double taxation of the inbound income. On the other
hand, allowing the interest deductions in full may produce negative tax rates and threatens the domestic tax
base. Thus, worldwide allocation is desirable for both
source and residence countries.
5.2. The benefits of a multilateral response
Rarely does a difficult international income tax issue
produce such a clear solution. Worldwide allocation of
interest expense by both source and resident countries
would eliminate a host of problems now bedevilling
nations throughout the world – problems that have produced varying, complex and inconsistent responses
among different countries, responses that frequently
may result in zero or double taxation. Given the flexibility of multinational corporations to choose where to
locate their borrowing and the difficulties nations have
in maintaining their domestic income tax bases in the
face of such flexibility, achieving a multilateral agreement for the treatment of interest expense based on a
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worldwide allocation should become a priority project
for both source and residence countries. The OECD and
the European Commission might lead the way. The
European Commission should begin by incorporating
such a rule into its common consolidated corporate tax
base project.40 For the OECD, making worldwide allocation a commonplace feature of bilateral income tax
treaties throughout the world, along with attendant
requirements for information sharing adequate for
source countries to be confident about their ability to
enforce such a rule, would be fair to all nations and substantially improve economic efficiency and internation
equity throughout the world. As has so often been the
case, a common multilateral solution may be accomplished piecemeal through bilateral income tax
treaties.41
Solving the problem of interest expense deductions on a
multilateral basis would offer great benefits to virtually
all nations. Unlike some other areas of international
income tax law where a nation may see substantial
advantages from pursuing a beggar-thy-neighbour tax
policy, there is no important national competitive
advantage available in departing from the solution I
have offered here. That alone does not make achieving a
multinational solution easy, but it might make it possible.

40. For an overview, see Weiner, Joann M., “Approaching an EU Common
Consolidated Tax Base”, 46 Tax Notes International 647 (14 May 2007).
41. One cannot help but note the irony that the most promising path to a
multilateral solution to an income tax issue is through revisions of bilateral
treaties.
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